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JURISDICTION
The Court has Jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to § 78-2-2(a) and § 78-2a-(2)(j),
U.C.A. (1953).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
L Where the State has conferred jurisdiction of a cause of action upon State district
courts, may it withhold jurisdiction of that cause from the federal district court in cases of
diversity of citizenship? Preserved: Response to Motion to Dismiss, July 6,2006; Ruling
and Order, October 5, 2006, at 7; Notice of Appeal.
2. May the District Court gratuitously assert failure to exhaust administrative
remedies where (a) no party so claims, (b) neither the court nor the parties can identify
any such remedy not exhausted, and (c) all remedies provided by the pertinent code have
been exhausted?
Preserved: Ruling and Order, October 5, 2006, at 11-13; Notice of Appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues present only questions of law. Review is de novo, without deference to the
views of the District Court. Colonial Leasing v. Farm Bros. Construction Co., 731 P.2d.
483 (Utah 1998).
STATEMENT OF CASE
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Plaintiffs filed this action in the United States District Court, District of Utah,
within 30 days of a decision of Park City Municipal Corporation, at the request of East
West Partners and United Park City Mines Co., to landlock property of plaintiffs,
preventing its development, in violation of a Park City Ordinance. The action seeks a
declaration of invalidity of the City's decision upon the grounds of failure of
compliance with the Ordinance and unconstitutional discrimination.

The United States District Court found that it had jurisdiction of the matter based upon
diversity of citizenship, but abstained on the ground the matter was better decided by a
State court. It did so without prejudice to re-file in the State District Court, which was
promptly done.
The Third District Court, on Motion to Dismiss, found that §10-9-1001 (2)(a),
U.C.A. (1953) disallows filing of such matters in the federal court; thus, subsequent
filing in the State Court following abstention was untimely. Further, though nowhere
raised in the Motion to Dismiss, the District Court found that plaintiff had failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. The Court did not resort to the Park City Code to
determine remedies available. It was not able to identify any remedies not exhausted.
The District Court dismissed the Complaint by Ruling and Order, October 5,2006, Notice
of Appeal was timely filed October 30, 2006.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Motion to Dismiss, the facts are as alleged in the Complaint, as follows:

5

L Plaintiff are the owners of land within the municipal limits of Park City,
generally denominated the Marsac Lode, Lot No. 61, aggregating approximately five
acres.
2. The Marsac Lode has been included by Park City in an eighty-four acre
development zone, generally denominated the "Mountain Village", as a part of a Master
Planned Development ("MPD"). The remainder of land included in said zone belongs to
UPCM, or its successor East West. Though all land within the "Mountain Village" is
identically zoned, Park City asserts that no land within said zone is entitled to the
development permitted by such zone except land belonging to UPCM or its successors.
3. Historically, the Mountain Village area has been accessible from the remainder of
Park City by State Road 224 ("SR224"), sometimes called Marsac Avenue.
4. In 2002, in order to maximize developability of its land within the Mountain
Village, UPCM, without permission from plaintiffs, relocated SR224 so that it bisected
the Marsac claim, severing the southeastern approximately two acres thereof from the
remainder.
5. UPCM then dedicated the relocated SR224 to the Utah Department of
Transportation ("UDOT"), which instituted negotiations with plaintiffs regarding
acquisition of title to maintain SR224 as relocated across the Marsac Claim.
6. Construction of SR224 across the Marsac claim created steep embankments and
other impediments to access, which render the southeast extension of the Marsac Claim
inaccessible, except through the property of UPCM.
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7. All land within the Mountain Village is subject to the burden to provide access to
adjoining land imposed by § 15-7.3-4, Park City Land Management Code.
8. May 25, 2005, the Park City Planning Commission, over the objections of
plaintiffs, under § 15-7.3-4, PCLMC, approved the subdivision of UPCM's land
adjoining the Marsac Claim on the southeast, and known as Village at Empire Pass (Pod
A ) West Side.
9. May 26, 2005, the City Council of Park City, over the objection of plaintiffs under
§ 15-7,3-4, PCLMC, approved the Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side.
10. As a result of said approval, the Marsac Claim has been rendered inaccessible
and un- developable, despite §15-7.3-4, PCLMC, as follows:
Proposed streets shall be extended to the boundary lines of the tract to be
subdivided, unless prevented by topography or other physical conditions, or unless
in the opinion of the Planning Commission such an extension is not necessary for
the coordination of the layout of the subdivision with the existing layout of the
most advantageous future development of adjoining tracts.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is unclear whether § 10-9-1001 (2)(a), U.C.A. (1953) intends that actions to review
municipal land use decisions be filed only in State district courts. It is a familiar
principle, however, that a statute will not be given a construction which is
unconstitutional, where a constitutional construction is available.
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Read to exclude the filing of such actions in the federal district court under its
diversity jurisdiction, § 10-9-1001 (2)(a) is unconstitutional. Under the Supremacy
Clause, states lack power to interfere with the jurisdiction of federal courts.
The federal district court, as it found, had jurisdiction of this matter upon filing.
Such filing, therefore, tolled the running of any statute of limitations. Plaintiffs did not
need to show "equitable tolling".
The District Court's gratuitous finding of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is simply misinformed.
What constitute remedies in a municipal planning proceeding is determined by the
municipal code, not the State code. The Park City Land Management Code provides that
decisions of the Planning Commission respecting MPDs, may be appealed to the City
Council. There is no appeal beyond the City Council with respect to MPD's. The
Complaint here recites that plaintiffs objected to the Planning Commission, then appealed
to the City Council. This exhausted the available remedies.
ARGUMENT
THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION
The District Court's Order cites two grounds: (1) limitation of filings to the State
District Court, and (2) failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The second is a false
issue. Neither the District Court nor defendants can point to any administrative remedy
not exhausted. The same claim had been raised before, and rejected by the U.S. District
Court. There are no unexhausted administrative remedies in this case.
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The first ground raises the only substantive issue in this case: may the State, by
statute, limit the jurisdiction of federal courts, in cases of diversity of citizenship, to hear
state law causes of action? The District Court holds that §10-9-1001 (2) (a) U.C.A.
(1953) limits the remedy to State District Courts. The answer to the question raised,
however, said to be "axiomatic" and "well-established" is "no". No such State
limitation is valid.
It is not questioned that as a ground rule the jurisdiction of federal courts over
cases within the field of their jurisdiction cannot be enlarged, diminished or
impaired by state statutes or regulations; and a person may not be deprived of his
right to resort to the federal courts by state regulation.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District v. Pacific Gas and Elect. Co.. 128 P.2d. 529, 532
(Calif. 1942).
I am of opinion that the defendant, as a third class city of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, situate in this district, is amendable to suit in this court, provided the
plaintiffs status is such as to establish diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff
and the defendant under Article III, Section 2 of the federal Constitution and the
laws of congress passed in pursuance thereof. It is true that the statue of
Pennsylvania relating to cities of third class which lie in more than one county
provides that such cities "shall * * * be deemed and considered as under and
within the jurisdiction of the courts of that county in which is situate the borough
first incorporated of those forming such consolidated borough." P.L. 1931, 1932 §
211, 53 P.S.Pa. § 12198-211. Defendant argues from this fact that the city of
Bethlehem, being such a city as is referred in the above mentioned statute, is
suable only in the state courts of Northampton County. I do not so conclude. The
various states of the Union fix by statute the jurisdiction of their own courts and
the venue of suits brought in those courts. Whenever an action is commenced in
the state courts, the proceedings therein must conform to the requirements of the
state statutes. It is otherwise in the respect of the proceedings commenced in or
removed to district court of the United States. There, if the matter in controversy
exceeds three thousands in value and the suit is brought to Federal Court on the
ground of diverse citizenship, the only questions to be answered, if there be only
one plaintiff and one defendant, are: (1) Are the plaintiff and defendant citizens
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of different states? And (2) is the defendant a resident in the district in which the
action was commenced?

Mr. Garrvv. Citv of Bethlehem. 45 F.Supp. 385, 385-386 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
The narrow issue before the court is whether the exclusive grant of original
jurisdiction to the state district courts over tort claims brought against counties,
municipalities and their officers prevents a federal district court from hearing such
claims pursuant to its pendent jurisdiction. I hold that section 41-4-18, N.M.
Stat.Ann. (1982 Repl. Pamp), which purports to confine exclusive original
jurisdiction for any claim under Tort Claims Act to the district courts of New
Mexico, is unconstitutional to the extent it acts to limit pendent jurisdiction of a
federal district court over tort claims against counties, municipalities, and their
officers
Once the state legislature waives sovereign immunity for counties and
municipalities and provides for enforcement of rights and remedies in the state
courts, it may not prevent the adjudication of these rights and remedies in a federal
district court if that court has jurisdiction under the constitution and laws of the
United States. It is axiomatic that, pursuant to the supremacy clause, article III
preempts any contrary state law. Section 41-4-18, therefore, is unconstitutional to
the extent it attempts to confine suits against New Mexico counties municipalities,
or county and municipal officers to New Mexico state district court and will not
have the effect of limiting the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.

Woiciechowski v. Harriman. 607 F.Supp. 631, 633, 635 (D.N.M. 1985).
The remaining issue is whether this Court lacks jurisdiction over this suit under
Ohio law. The enabling statute for the OTC provides, in pertinent part:
[t]he Ohio Turnpike Commission may do any of the following:
#

*

*

*

*

*

(4) Sue and be sued in its own name, plead and be impleaded, provided any
actions against the commission shall be brought in the common court of pleas
of the county in which the principal office of the commission is located, or in
the court of common pleas in the county in which the cause of action arose if
that county is located within this state....
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It is well-settled that states can cloak themselves and the entities they create in
sovereign immunity. However, once a state elects to make a state-created entity
subject to suit, the entity is subject to provisions of Article III, § 2 of the United
States Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) giving the federal courts
jurisdiction over claims between citizens of different states
Here, Ohio chose to make the OTC liable to suit. It cannot by statute subsequently
divest this Court of its diversity jurisdiction over the OTC. Therefore, this Court
concludes that the dispute is appropriately before it.
Wildner Contracting Co.. Inc. v. Ohio Turnpike Commission. 913, F. Supp. 1031, 1037
(N.D. Ohio 1996).
Even if it could be shown that § 10-9-100 l(2)(a) intended to limit jurisdiction to
State District Courts, the statute could not do so. The constitutional interpretation of §
10-9-100 l(2)(a) is that it permits filing in any district court having jurisdiction, including
a federal district court having diversity jurisdiction.
The statute of limitations contained in § 10-9-100 l(2)(a) could not run after the
action was filed in a court having jurisdiction.
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
The District Court rules that, though the Motion before it did not raise the matter,
the "plain error doctrine" (citing State v. Morrison. 937 P.2d. 1293,1296 (U. App. 1997))
allowed the Court to find that plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies.
This was plain error.
It did not occur to the District Court that the matter was not raised in the Motion
because it could not be. There were no administrative remedies to exhaust. This was
fully plead in the Complaint.
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Notwithstanding the general rule of §10-9-405, U.C.A. (1953), the specific rule of
the Park City Land Management Code ("PCLMC") is that matters of compliance with the
code regarding Master Planned Developments are addressed in the first instance to the
Planning Commission- An appeal from the decisions of the Planning Commission will lie
to the City Council. No further appeals will lie. PCLMC §15-1-18 (c). The Complaint in
this case states with particularly that objection was made to the Planning Commission,
followed by appeal to the City Council. While it does not state that no further appeals
were available, this was amply sufficient to show exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Defendants did not raise the matter because there was nothing to raise.
The foregoing matter was attempted to be explained to the District Court at
hearing, as reflected in note 5 of the Ruling and Order. At hearing plaintiff challenged
defendants to identify any remedy not exhausted; they could not.

CONCLUSIONS
The District Court ruling was in error on both of the matters asserted in support.
The ruling should be promptly reversed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 22nd day of February, 2007.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN
FONDS a n d STICHTING MAYFLOWER
RECREATIONAL FONDS, N e t h e r l a n d s
associations,
Plaintiffs,

RULING a n d ORDER
C a s e No.

060500190

J u d g e BRUCE C. LUBECK

vs.
DATE: O c t o b e r

5,

2006

PARK CITY MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION, EAST WEST
PARTNERS, a n d UNITED PARK CITY
MINES CO.,

Defendants.
The above matter came before the court on October 2, 2006,
for oral argument on motion of United Park City Mines (United
Park) to dismiss.

Plaintiffs (Mayflower) were present through E.

Craig Smay, Park City and East West Partners (East West)were
present through Mark R. Gaylord, and United Park was present
through Robert S. Campbell, Clark K. Taylor, Stephen K.
Christiansen.
United Park filed this motion on May 26, 2006.

It was

joined by Park City on June 8, 2006, and joined by East West on
July 10, 2006.

United Park filed a request to submit on July 5,

2006, asserting plaintiffs had not filed an opposition.

On that

same day, plaintiffs requested a hearing, asserting they had not
received the motion.

The next day, July 6, 200 6, plaintiffs

filed a response to the motion.

United Park filed a motion to

strike that response on July 18, 2006.

Plaintiffs filed an

objection to the request to submit on July 19, 2006.
filed no reply.

United Park

A restated request to submit was filed by United

Park on July 18, 2006.

The court then scheduled oral argument

and thereafter took the matter under advisement.

The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties heard
oral argument, and concludes as follows.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed this complaint April 19, 2006.

In summary

Mayflower seeks a declaration that Park City's approval of United
Park's Village at Empire Pass, (Pod A) West Side, discriminates
against Mayflower's land and violates the Park City Land
Management Code (Code) and the United States and Utah
Constitutions. Mayflower owns land. Claim No. 61, of the Marsac
Lode, and that has been included by Park City in a development
known at Mountain Village.
its successor East West.

Some lands belong to United Park or

Though all the land is identically

zoned, Park City has maintained no land may be developed except
that which belongs to United Park or its successors.
United Park relocated SR 224, the access
Maisac

In 2002

road, so it bisects the

claim, severing two acres from the remainder, and that was

done without permission of Mayflower.

United Park then dedicated

the relocated SR 224 to the Utah Department of Transportation

-2-

(UDOT) . That relocated road created steep embankments which
impede access and render a portion of Mayflower's land
inaccessible except across United Park's land.
As causes of action, Mayflower claims Park City approved the
subdivision of United Park's land adjoining the Marsac Claim in
May 2005.

This violates the Park City Code, section 15-7.3-4,

which provides that proposed streets shall be extended to the
boundary lines of the tract to be subdivided unless topography
prevents that or the Planning Commission finds it is not
necessaryPark City filed an answer on May 30, 2006, and later joined
in the motion to dismiss filed by United Park.

East West also

filed an answer July 10, 2006, and joined in the motion to
dismiss the same day.

ARGUldENTS
United Park moves to dismiss under URCP, Rule 12(b) (6). If
it appears plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any
set of facts pleaded, such a motion may be granted.
United Park claims this complaint is really an appeal of a
land planning decision of Park City made in May 2005.

A land

planning decision is subject to review under the Municipal Land
Use Development and Management Act, MLUDMA.. A petition for
judicial review must be made withing 30 days of final action, or

-3-

by June 2005.
Historically, Mayflower filed a complaint in United States
District Court on June 22, 2005. That was dismissed by that court
in April, 2006. This complaint followed within a few days. That
mistaken filing does not toll the limitations period of MLUDMA.
Moreover, the complaint does not state a claim that the Park
City decision violates either the Due Process or Equal Protection
clauses of the United States or Utah Constitutions.
Mayflower is said to have no claim of entitlement to a
state-created right.

Park City had and has legitimate discretion

to deny Mayflower'' s proposed use.

If there is no invidious

discrimination, such as on racial grounds, a planning decision is
a matter for the state and does not implicate the State of
Federal Constitution. Thus, the review is limited to whether the
decision was arbitrary or capricious. Mayflower does not even
claim it had a legitimate claim of entitlement, and they could
not prove such even if they

made the claim. Mayflower was not

entitled to a denial of the Village at Empire Pass' right of
development. Mayflower has not alleged, and could not prove, that
Park City lacked discretion in approving the Village at Empire
Pass.
The complaint has alleged invidious discrimination, but no
facts could be shown that would entitle plaintiffs to relief.
There is no racial animus or other stereotyping that would allow

-4-

such a claim to stand.
As to the equal protection claim, there must be membership
in a particular group before a decision of a decision-maker could
violate another's equal protection rights.

That has not been

alleged nor could it be proven.
Further, the complaint alleges MLUDMA has been violated, and
it is cited as OCA .10-9-405.

The statute has been renumbered and

thus the complaint fails to give notice and should be dismissed.

Mayflower filed a response and urges that the federal court
dismissed the case based on principles of abstention rather than
the merit of the allegations as such.

The dismissal of the

federal court action was without prejudice to proceeding in state
court, where the State interests were stated to be paramount.
The case was filed in a district court where it remained, as a
challenge to the Park City decision, until the federal court
dismissed it not on the merits but on abstention grounds. Thus,
no time limits for seeking review were missed.
As to the merits, Mayflower agrees it has never asserted it
was entitled to a denial of United Park's project.

Mayflower

asserts that its own land in the same development zone has been
denied development rights, and that is the unlawful conduct.
Mayflower claims Park City and United Park contracted and agreed
that Park City would allow United Park to develop land but no one

-5-

else could do so without United Park's consent. That has not been
denied for purposes of this motion.
The complaint does allege invidious discrimination, and
"group" discrimination may be inferred: the discrimination is
against non-resident, foreign investors.

Plaintiff need not

prove discrimination at this point. Park City allowed one of two
land owners to develop, and both are similarly situated, and a
claim is thus stated for relief.
The statute cited, MLUDMA, was numbered as Mayflower pleaded
it at the time of the events, and so a re-numbering is not
defective and United Park's argument is called by plaintiff
"comic relief.If

DISCUSSION
"A Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged
in the complaint but challenges the plaintiff's right to relief
based on those facts."

Oakwood

Vill.

2004 UT 101 1 8, 104 P. 3d 1226.

L.L.C.

v.

Albertsons,

Inc.,

The purpose of a motion to

dismiss "is to challenge the formal sufficiency of the claim for
relief, not to establish the facts or resolve the merits of a
case."

Whipple

v.

Am. Fork

Irrigation

Co.,

910 P.2d 1218, 1220

(Utah 1996) . "A dismissal is a severe measure and should be
granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is
not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be

-6-

proved in support of its claim. "

Colman v.

Utah State

Land

Bd.T

795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).

The threshold d i s p u t e of the p a r t i e s i s whether Mayflower's
claims are barred by MLUDMA's s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n
Utah Code Annotated

§ 10-9-1001(2) ( a ) . 1

provision,

That p r o v i s i o n

states

that :
Any person adversely affected by any decision
made in the exercise of or in violation of the
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for
review of the decision with the district court
within 30 days after the local decision is
rendered.
Mayflower does not dispute that the current action was filed
in this court more than 30 days after the alleged violation, but
maintains that because it' filed the action in federal district
court within 30 days, it's right to review is protected.
Mayflower correctly notes that the federal court did not. find
that the matter had been filed in the "wrong" court, but simply
found that the matter was best heard in state court and therefore
abstained from hearing the matter.
The issue remains, however, whether filing the matter in
federal court satisfied § 10-9-1001(2)(a) or, alternatively,
whether the federal filing tolled the limitations period.

The

court is not convinced that filing in federal district court
1

The parties dispute whether the 2004 version or the 2005
version of the statute applies. Although the Court cites the
2004 version because the violation purportedly occurred in 2004,
the analysis and result would be the same under either version.
-7-

satisfied rhe statute of limitations.

Mayflower contends that

the matter "has always been in a court having jurisdiction, "
referring to the federal district court and then this court.
However, § 10-9-1001(2)(a) does not allow the petition to be
filed in "a court having jurisdiction," but requires that the
petition be filed with "the

district court" (emphasis added).

In

addition to this plain language, it is important to note that the
provision is part of a comprehensive state scheme regarding
municipal land use development and management.

The context of

the provision in a comprehensive state land use scheme supports a
finding that ^the district court" refers to the state district
court where the decision is made by a land use body, not a
federal district court or some other district court in, for
example, another state or even another county.
no authority or argument for finding that

Mayflower offers

AA

the district court"

includes a federal district court and this court declines to
interpret it in such a fashion.

Therefore, Mayflower's filing in

federal district court did not satisfy the 30 day filing period.
The remaining question, then, is whether the limitations
period was tolled.

Mayflower does not contend that the statutory

tolling provision in § 10-9-1001(2) (a) applies, and indeed, it
does not.

Therefore, if the limitations period is to be tolled,

it must be through equitable tolling.
The Utah Supreme Court recently noted that "[n]o Utah court

-8-

has ever found occasion to equitably toll a limitations period
when there has not first been a demonstration that the party
seeking the tolling could invoke the discovery rule due to an
excusable delay in discovering the underlying claim before the
Beaver

limitations period expired."
Division

of the

P.3d 1187.

Utah State

County

Tax Commissionr

v. Property

Tax

2006 DT 6 I 29, 128

It is undisputed in this case that Mayflower knew of

the claimed violation prior to the expiration of the limitations
period and therefore the discovery rule does not apply.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not held that equitable
tolling is never available outside of the discovery rule context,
it has stated that it is a "high bar" for "those seeking such
Beaver

extraordinary relief to hurdle."

County,

2006 UT at 1 29.

To meet this hurdle, Mayflower must show "exceptional
circumstances where the application of the general rule would be
'irrational7 or ^unjust.7" Estes

v.

The Honorable

1999 UT 52 5 5, 979 P. 2d 823 (quoting Sevy

v.

Don V.

Security

Tibbs,

Title

Co.,

902 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995).
Mayflower does not cite a single case from any jurisdiction
showing that filing in a federal district court that subsequently
abstains from hearing the matter should toll the limitations
period.2

Although this Court7 s own research uncovered at least

2

Indeed, Mayflower does not cite one case anywhere in its
hriefing in support of any of its arguments. Such lack of
citation is surprising where Mayflower contends both the federal

-9-

one such c a s e , 3 t h i s c o u r t does not f i n d t h a t

Mayflower's

ciicumstances warrant ''exceptional circumstances" as

required

under Utah law.
In Beaver

County,

t h e Utah S t a t e Tax Commission

determined

t h a t i t c o u l d e q u i t a b l y t o l l t h e s t a t u t o r y p e r i o d on

issuing

escaped p r o p e r t y t a x e s t o a l l o w i t s P r o p e r t y Tax D i v i s i o n
i s s u e an a s s e s s m e n t a g a i n s t a u t i l i t y company.
2006 UT a t I I .

Beaver

to

County,

The Commission e q u i t a b l y t o l l e d t h e p e r i o d

of f a i r n e s s t o c o u n t i e s who had i n t e r v e n e d b e c a u s e t h e

out

counties

had done e v e r y t h i n g t h e y c o u l d t o g e t t h e P r o p e r t y Tax D i v i s i o n
to i s s u e a t i m e l y a s s e s s m e n t .

Id.

a t f 26.

The Utah Supreme C o u r t r e v e r s e d and found t h a t i t would n o t
be i r r a t i o n a l or u n j u s t t o a p p l y t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d

because

the P r o p e r t y Tax D i v i s i o n c l e a r l y had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o make a
timely assessment.

Beaver

County,

2006 UT a t 5 2 8 .

The c o u r t

concluded t h a t " [ w ] h i l e t h i s outcome may seem h a r s h i n t h a t

it

d e p r i v e s t h e C o u n t i e s of an o p p o r t u n i t y t o l i t i g a t e a n y c l a i m .to
t h e t a x r e v e n u e , i t i s t h e n e c e s s a r y r e s u l t of h a v i n g

limitations

p e r i o d s and t h e accompanying b e n e f i t of f i n a l i t y f o r which t h e s e

and s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n s h a v e been v i o l a t e d .
i t c l e a r l y does not
make t h e C o u r t ' s j o b any e a s i e r when one p a r t y d o e s n o t s u p p o r t
any of i t s a s s e r t i o n s w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e a u t h o r i t y .
3

See Encompass S e r v i c e s Holding Corp, v. P r o s e r o I n c . , 2005
Del. Ch. LEXIS 17 ( u s i n g e q u i t a b l e t o l l i n g where p l a i n t i f f
b e l i e v e d t h a t he was r e q u i r e d t o f i l e t h e c l a i m i n h i s B a n k r u p t c y
action).
-10-

statues were designed.

Limitations periods exist to extinguish

claims not acted upon; thus, the loss of a claim occurs every
time these time limits are enforced, and such a loss is simply
not a reason to toll the statutory period absent application of
the discovery rule."

Id.

at ! 46.

The Utah Supreme Court's application • of the limitations
period in Beaver

County

is more harsh to the counties than

application of the periods to Mayflower is in this case.
Mayflower's complaint filed in federal district court was filed
under diversity jurisdiction and its sole cause of action was for
violation of the Utah Code.

Mayflower should have known that

there was at least a possibility that the federal court would
abstain from hearing the matter in favor of a state court. Land
use matters are certainly traditionally state concerns.

State

courts are not forbidden from entertaining constitutional claims
of discrimination either.

Mayflower should have also known it

was taking a risk where the limitations period was only 30 days.
Nevertheless, Mayflower chose to take that risk and file in •
federal district court.

Although it may now seem, harsh to

deprive Mayflower of its opportunity to have its claims heard,
the claim seeks a review of action by the county.

This court is

bound to follow the law as set out by statute and the Utah
Supreme Court.
Moreover, even if this court could find that Mayflower's

-11-

circumstances are "exceptional," Mayflower's claims could still
not be brought because it failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies.4

Section 10-9-1001(1) states that u[n]o person may

challenge in district court a municipality's land use decisions
made under this chapter or under the regulation made under
authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his
administrative remedies."

Section 10-9-704 (1) (a) (I) further

provides that "any . . . person . . . adversely affected by a
decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance may
appeal that decision applying the zoning ordinance by alleging
that there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or
determination made by an official in the administration or
interpretation of the zoning ordinance."
Mayflower's entire claim is that it was adversely affected
by Park City's decision not to enforce its zoning ordinance
properly

and require United Park to provide access

Mayflower's property.5

to

Because Mayflower's allegations involve a

4

Although this matter was not briefed by the parties, it was
argued at oral argument. Moreover, the plain error doctrine
allows this Court to correct obvious errors. See State v.
Morrision, 937 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (reversing
conviction because trial court did not sua sponte prevent
improper testimony from coming in as evidence).
5

At oral argument, Mayflower contended that since it was not
seeking an application to develop its own property, but simply
asking that Park City enforce its zoning ordinance and require
United Park to provide access to Mayflower's property, there was
no decision to appeal. However, the statute allows appeals of
"any . . . decision . . . made by an official in the
-12-

municipal decision administering a zoning ordinance, Mayflower
was obligated to appeal that decision prior to filing a petition
in the district court.

Mayflower has not pled that it ever filed

such an appeal and therefore it is barred from alleging a
violation of § 10-9-405.

Therefore, for the above reasons, United Park's Motion to
Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.6

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the Court and no other
order is required.

DATED this __J

day of

C '(^

^

, 2006.

administration . . . of the zoning ordinance." UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§ 10-9-704(1)(a)(I). This is clearly broad enough to include
Park City's refusal to enforce the ordinance.
6

United Park also filed a motion to strike Mayflower's
opposition memorandum alleging that Mayflower violated this
Court's July 5, 2006 order. Whatever technical violation might
have occurred, this court does not find that striking Mayflower's
response is necessary and the response was fully considered in
this Court's decision. United Park's motion to strike is DENIED.
-13-
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

SHOTTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN
FONDS and SHOTTING MAYFLOWER
RECREATIONAL FONDS, Netherlands
associations,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO AMEND AND
GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,

vs.
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION, EAST WEST
PARTNERS, and UNITED PARK CITY
MINES CO., a Delaware corporation,

CaseNo.2:05-CV-525TS

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for oral argument on a number of motions on April 10,
2006. For the reasons stated at the hearing, the Court denied United Park City Mines' ("United")
Motions to Strike. The Court also denied United's Motion for Sanctions. The Court heard
argument on, and took under advisement, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss. For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and
will grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

1

SIS
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L BACKGROUND
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they are owners of land called the Marsac Lode
in Park City, Utah. This land has been included in an eighty-four acre development zone called
the Mountain Village. The rest of the land in the Mountain Village belongs to United or East
West Partners, Previously, the Mountain Village has been accessible by State Road 224 ("SR
224"). In 2002, Plaintiffs allege that United relocated SR 224 so that it now bisects Plaintiffs'
land, severing the southeastern two acres from the rest of the land. United then dedicated SR 224
to the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"). Plaintiffs state that they are in
negotiations with UDOT regarding acquisition of title to maintain SR 224. As a result of this
new construction of SR 224, Plaintiffs allege that the southeast portion of their land is
inaccessible, except through the property of United.
On May 25,2005, the Park City Planning Commission, over Plaintiffs' objections,
approved the subdivision of UnitedJs land adjoining Plaintiffs' land on the southeast. This
subdivision is known as the Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side. On May 26, 2005, the
City Council of Park City, again over the objections of Plaintiffs, approved that subdivision. As
a result, Plaintiffs allege that their land has been rendered inaccessible and they are unable to
develop it Plaintiffs allege violations of § 15-73-4 of the Park City Land Management Code1
and § 10-9-405(2) of Utah Code Annotated.2 Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that Park
^Proposed Streets shall be extended to the boundary lines of the tract to be subdivided,
unless prevented by topography or other physical conditions, or unless in the opinion of the
Planning Commission such an extension is not necessary for the coordination of the layout of the
Subdivision with the existing layout of the most advantageous future development of adjoining
tracts."
2

"The legislative body shall ensure that the regulations are uniform for each class or kind
of buildings throughout each zoning district, but the regulations in one zone may differ from
2
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City's approval of United's Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side Subdivision violated
Plaintiffs' rights under the above-named provisions.
E. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND
Plaintiffs havefileda Motion to Amend their Amended Complaint They seek to add
claims that Defendants' actions violate Section 1 of the 14th Amendment and Sections 7 and 24
of Article 1 of the Utah Constitution. Plaintiffs also seek to add a claim for damages in the
amount of $2.5 million. They do so in an apparent attempt to bolster their claim that this Court
should exercise jurisdiction over this matter. The Court is not persuaded. For the reasons
discussed below, the Court will abstain and will dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint without
prejudice to its filing in state court. Plaintiffs proposed amendments do not change this outcome.
Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend is denied.
HI. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS3
Although not styled as such, the Court finds that Defendant United's Motion to Dismiss
is better considered a Motion for Abstention under Burford v. Sun Oil Co.4 "Abstention from the
exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule."5 "Burford-ty$$ abstention is

those in other zones."
3

Defendant United hasfileda Motion to Dismiss in which Defendants Park City and East
West Partners have joined. The Court will refer to these Motions as a single Motion to Dismiss.
4

319 U.S. 315 (1943). Plaintiffs argue that abstention is inappropriate and direct the
Court to the case of Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995). That case, however, does
not address abstention under Burford, but rather another abstention doctrine found in Brillhart v.
Excess Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 316 U.S. 491 (1942) and Colorado River Water Conservation DisL
v. United States, 242 U.S. 800 (1976). Therefore, Wilton is inapposite here.
"Colorado River Water Conservation DisL v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976).
3
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deference by a federal court in order to avoid needlessly interfering in state activities." The
Supreme Court has stated that
Burford allows a federal court to dismiss a case only if it presents difficult
questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial import whose
importance transcends the results in the case then at bar or if its adjudication in a
federal forum would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy
with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.7
"Ultimately, what is at stake is a federal court's decision, based on a careful consideration of the
federal interest in retaining jurisdiction over the dispute and the competing concern for the
independence of state action, that the State's interests are paramount and that a dispute would
best be adjudicated in a state forum."8 "This equitable decision balances the strong federal
interest in having certain classes of cases, and certain federal rights, adjudicated in federal court,
against the State's interest in maintaining uniformity in the treatment of an essentially local
problem."9
In Burford, the Supreme Court considered whether a federal court should have
entertained an action attacking the validity of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission
granting Burford a permit to drill certain oil wells.10 The state's scheme for regulating oil and
gas drilling was extremely complex and, in an effort to avoid confusion, the state legislature

"Walker Operating Corp. v. F.RR.C, 874 R2d 1320,1330 (10th Cir. 1989).
"Quakenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 726-27 (1996) (internal quotations
omitted).
*Id. at 728 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
9

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

10

319 U.S. at 316-17.
4
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limited initial review of a decision by the Texas Railroad Commission to a single district court.11
As a result of the system that the state had established, the Court held that federal courts should
abstain from hearing cases challenging orders of the Texas Railroad Commission12
Here, the state has set up a complex and comprehensive set of land use regulations under
Utah's Municipal Land Use Development Management Act ("MLUDMA"). Part of the
MLUDMA establishes a process whereby a party aggrieved by a municipal planning or zoning
decision may file a petition for review with the district court/3 Since this is a state statute, the
Court finds that the reference to "district court" in this statute is to a state district court, not a
federal district court.
Additionally, land use and zoning laws are quintessential areas of state and local
concern.14 As the numerous cases cited by United indicate, federal courts should be wary of
entering into local land use disputes and should not sit as a zoning board of appeal.15 Because of
these considerations, any adjudication of these issues in a federal forum would be disruptive of
state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.16

n

Id. at 318-26.

12

Id. at 333-34.

13

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(2)(a).

"FE.RC

v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,768 n.30 (1982).

"Norton v. Village ofCoirales, 103 F.3d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 1996); Spencev.
Zimmerman, 873 R2d 256, 262 (11th Cir. 1989); Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates,
844 R2d 461,467 (7th Cir. 1988); Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832
n.9 (1st Cir. 1982); Construction Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City ofPetaluma, 522 F.2d
897, 906 (9th Cir. 1975).
"Quakenbush, 517 U.S. at 726-27.
5
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After careful consideration of the federal and state interests at issue here, the Court finds that the
state's interests are paramount and that this dispute would best be adjudicated in a state forum.17
Therefore, the Court will invoke the doctrine of abstention under Burford and dismiss this case
without prejudice to itsfilingin state court.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend (Docket No. 41) is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 27, 33, and 34) are
GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice to its filing in state
court.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case forthwith.
DATED April 11, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

TED STEWART
states District Judge

'Id. at 728.
6
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ARK CITY MUNICIPAL CODE - TITLE 15 LMC, Chapter 7.3 - Requirements for
Improvements, Reservations, and Design
15-7.3-7

shall be buried in any land, or left or
deposited on any Lot or Street at the time of
issuance of a certificate of occupancy, and
removal of same shall be required prior to
issuance of any certificate of occupancy on a
Subdivision, nor shall any be left or
deposited in any Area of the Subdivision at
the time of expiration of the performance
bond or dedication of public improvements,
whichever is sooner.
(K)
FENCING Each Applicant and/or
Developer shall be required to furnish and
install Fences wherever the Planning
Commission determines upon the
recommendation of the Community
Development Director that a hazardous
condition may exist. The Fences shall be
constructed according to standards to be
established by the City Engineer and shall be
noted as to height and material on the Final
Plat. No certificate of occupancy shall be
issued until said Fence improvements have
been duly installed.
15-7.3-4.
ROAD REQUIREMENTS
AND DESIGN.
(A)

LAYOUT REQUIREMENTS.
(1)
GENERAL LAYOUT
REQUIREMENTS.
(a)
Roads shall be graded
and improved and conform to
the Park City Design
Standards, Construction
Specifications, and Standard
Drawings and shall be
approved as to design and
specifications by the City
Engineer, in accordance with

the construction plans
required to be submitted prior
to Final Plat approval. Prior
to Final Plat approval the
Public Works Director and
the Community Development
Director shall make the
determination as to whether
each Street is to be public or
private. Such status shall be
shown on the plat.
(b)
The rigid rectangular
gridiron Street pattern need
not necessarily be adhered to,
and the use of curvilinear
Streets, Cul-de-sacs, orUshaped Streets shall be
encouraged where such use
will result in a more desirable
layout.
(c)
In business and
industrial Developments, the
Streets and other Access
ways shall be planned in
connection with the grouping
of Buildings, location of rail
facilities, and the provision of
alleys, truck loading and
maneuvering Areas, and
walks and parking Areas so
as to minimize conflict of
movement between the
various types of traffic,
including pedestrian.

ARK CITY MUNICIPAL CODE - TITLE 15 LMC, Chapter 7.3 - Requirements for
Improvements, Reservations, and Design
15-7.3-8
(d)
Proposed Streets shall
be extended to the boundary
lines of the tract to be
subdivided, unless prevented
by topography or other
physical conditions, or unless
in the opinion of the Planning
Commission such an
extension is not necessary for
the coordination of the layout
of the Subdivision with the
existing layout or the most
advantageous future
Development of adj acent
tracts.

(2) FRONTAGE ON AND
ARRANGEMENT TO
IMPROVED ROADS.
(a)
No Subdivision shall
be approved unless the Area
to be subdivided has Frontage
on and Access from an
existing Street on the Streets
Master Plan unless such
Street is an existing state or
county highway; or a Street
shown upon a plat approved
by the Planning Commission
and recorded in the County
Recorder's office. Such
Street or highway must be
suitably improved as required
by the highway rules,
regulations, specifications, or
orders, or be secured by a
performance Guarantee
required under these
Subdivision regulations, with
the width and Right-of-Way
required by these Subdivision

regulations or the Streets
Master Plan.
Wherever the Area to be
subdivided is to utilize
existing road Frontage, such
road shall be suitably
improved as provided
hereinabove.
(b)
All Streets shall be
properly integrated with the
existing and proposed system
of thoroughfares and
dedicated Rights-of-Way as
established in the Streets
Master Plan.
(c)
All thoroughfares
shall be properly related to
specific traffic generators
such as industries, business
districts, schools, churches,
and shopping centers; to
population densities; and to
the pattern of existing,
proposed, and future land
uses.
(3)
ROAD ARRANGEMENT
IN RELATION TO
TOPOGRAPHY.
(a)
Roads shall be related
appropriately to the
topography. Local roads may
be curved to avoid
conformity of Lot appearance
and to discourage through
traffic. All Streets shall be
arranged so as to obtain as
many as possible of the

p

ARK CITY MUNICIPAL CODE
Procedures

15-1 -15.

TITLE 15 LMC, Chapter 1 - General Provisions and
15-1-15

PENALTIES.

Any Person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, and the principals or Agents
thereof violating or causing the violation of
•this LMC shall be guilty of a Class "C"
misdemeanor and punished upon conviction
by a fine and/or imprisonment described in
the current Park City Criminal Code. In
addition, the City shall be entitled to bring a
civil action to enjoin and/or abate the
continuation of the violation.
Private citizens of Park City or Property
Owners have the right to file actions to
enjoin the continuation of a violation
affecting their interests, provided that the
plaintiff in such action gives notice of the
action to the City Recorder prior to filing the
action.
15-1 -16.

LICENSING.

Licenses or permits issued in violation of
this LMC are null and void.
15-1-17.
RIGHTS

VESTING OF ZONING

(A)
Upon submittal of a Complete
Application, the Application shall vest
pursuant to the terms of the LMC and
Zoning Map in effect at the time of filing the
Complete Application.
(B)
Vesting of all Permits and approvals
terminates upon the expiration or
termination of the permit or approval.
(C)
EXCEPTIONS. Applications shall
not vest:

(1)
when revisions to the LMC
are pending at the time of
Application which would prohibit or
further condition the approval
sought; or
(2)
when there exists a
compelling and countervailing
health, safety or welfare reason for
applying the pending standard.
15-1-18.
APPEALS AND
RECONSIDERATION PROCESS.
(A)
STAFF. Any decision by the
Community Development Director
regarding Application of this LMC to a
Property may be appealed to the Planning
Commission. Decisions regarding
compliance with the Historic District
Guidelines may be appealed to the Historic
District Commission. The appeal must be
filed with the Community Development
Department. There shall be no additional
notice for appeal of the staff determination
other than listing the matter on the agenda,
unless notice of the staff review" was
provided in which case the same notice must
be given for the appeal.
(B)
HISTORIC DISTRICT
COMMISSION (HDC). Final Actions by
the Historic District Commission may be
appealed to the Board of Adjustment.
(C)
PLANNING COMMISSION.
Final Actions by the Planning Commission
on staff appeals may be appealed to the
Board of Adjustment Final Action by the
Planning Commission on Conditional Use
permits and MPDs may be appealed to the
City Council.

ARK CITY MUNICIPAL CODE Procedures
(D)
STANDING TO APPEAL. The
following has standing to appeal a Final
Action:
(1)
Any Person who submitted
written comment or testified on a
proposal before the Community
Development Department, Historic
District Commission or Planning
Commission;
(2)
The Owner of any Property
within three hundred feet (3 00') of
the boundary of the subject site;
(3)
Any City official, Board or
Commission having jurisdiction over
the matter; and
(4)
The Owner of the subject
Property.
(E)
TIMING. All appeals must be made
within ten (10) calendar days of the Final
Action. The reviewing body, with the
consultation of the appellant, shall set a date
for the appeal.
(F)
FORM OF APPEALS. Appeals to
the Planning Commission or Board of
Adjustment must be filed with the
Community Development Department.
Appeals to the City Council must be filed
with the City Recorder. Appeals must be by
letter or petition, and must contain the name,
address, and telephone number of the
petitioner; his or her relationship to the
project or subject Property; and must have a
comprehensive statement of all the reasons
for the appeal, including specific provisions
of the law, if known, that are alleged to be
violated by the action taken.

15 LMC, Chapter 1 - General Provisions and
15-1-16
(G)
WRITTEN FINDINGS
REQUIRED. The appellate body shall
direct staff to prepare detailed written:
(1)
Findings of Fact which
explain and support the Staff
decision;
(2)
Conclusions as to how a
contrary decision would violate the
provisions of this LMC, other City
ordinances, or applicable state or
federal laws or regulations.
(H)
CITY COUNCIL ACTION ON
APPEALS.
(1)
The City Council, with the
consultation of the appellant, shall
set a date for the appeal.
(2)
The City Recorder shall
notify the Owner of the appeal date.
The City Recorder shall obtain the
findings, conclusions and all other
pertinent information from the
Community Development
Department and shall transmit them
to the Council.

